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The risks related to existing hydraulic structures have been analyzed using bayesian 
networks. The proposed multidisciplinary approach allowed the comparison, 
according to the probability of failure being used as a common denominator, of the 
geotechnical, hydrological and structural risks. The factors contributing the most to 
the overall risk have been identified as well as the interventions to be realized in 




No one can predict risk with certainty because two of its main characteristics are 
complexity and uncertainty (Denis 1998). Even when a dam is judged to be safe, 
there still exists a residual risk that is always present if population or property are 
located in the flood zone. Dam failures are not common but they always have 
important human, material and environmental consequences. The establishment of 
risk-reduction measures is therefore an important part of the responsibilities of a dam 
owner. 
A safety assessment of the civil structures of an irrigation and flood control 
project located in Asia showed that the embankment dam and the spillway present 
multiple technical problems that could endanger their short-term safety. Risk-
reduction measures need to be implemented. Risk analysis methodologies such as 
event trees or fault trees present some limitations related to the representation of dam 
risk in absolute terms and also in taking into account the complexity and the 
uncertainties related to the potential failure mechanisms. The use of bayesian 
networks is proposed to overcome some weaknesses of the existing tools and to 
capitalize on their merits. 
This paper discusses how bayesian networks were used for the analysis of the 
geotechnical and hydrological risks related to the embankment dam and the risk 
related to the reliability of the electrical/mechanical components of the spillway. This 
assessment considered the interrelations between the potential failure mechanisms as 





2. Problem description 
 
The analyzed project is comprised of a dam and a spillway. The dam is a 25 m high 
and 860 m long clay embankment without internal drainage and founded on untreated 
soil foundation. The fill placement was realized without the use of heavy machinery 
and quality control procedures. The spillway, located near the left abutment of the 
dam, is equipped with three gates lifted manually using a winch installed on a mobile 
gantry crane. A electrical motor is available to facilitate gate lifting. 
A dam safety assessment showed that the internal erosion process has initiated 
and is still progressing due to the absence of filters in the dam and its foundation. 
This process is somewhat controlled by reservoir level restrictions. An insufficient 
spillway capacity and a lack of adequate freeboard represent a significant overtopping 
risk for the dam during typhoons due to the heavy precipitations and waves caused by 
strong winds. Moreover, the mechanical/electrical components of the spillway are 
unreliable. Also, during periods of strong winds, the gantry crane becomes unstable 
and cannot be operated. The risk of overtopping is significant even during less severe 
flooding events. 
Rehabilitation works are needed to increase the safety of the civil works and to 
reduce the risks imposed to the population living downstream. These measures will 
also restore irrigation and flood control capabilities. Four options are considered: 
1. Rehabilitation of the existing gates and lifting mechanism. 
2. Addition of a fourth gate to increase spilling capacity. 
3. Construction of a filtering berm to control the ongoing internal erosion. 
4. Construction of a parapet wall on the dam crest to increase storage volume 
and flood routing capabilities. 
Considering the importance of this rehabilitation project for the local economy 
and the numerous interrelations between the failure mechanisms, an assessment of the 
overall risk is required to select the option offering the maximum risk-reduction 
potential for a minimal cost. 
 
3. Interrelations between failure mechanisms 
 
The selection of the rehabilitation option to be realized in priority is not evident since 
the overtopping and internal erosion failure mechanisms are interrelated. When the 
reservoir level is higher, the risk of overtopping increases as well as the risk of 
internal erosion since the hydraulic gradient across the dam becomes higher. Also, the 
reservoir level depends on the precipitations and the reliability of the spillway. The 
presence of waves and strong winds also affect the overtopping risk and spillway 
operability. Moreover, the available data and knowledge regarding the hydrological 
and geotechnical aspects of the project are uncertain. 
The problems related to the safety of a dam are unique from one structure to 
another and do not always fall neatly into the loading categories customarily 
considered in risk analyzes. The interactive influences between the failure 
mechanisms can be easy to overlook (Vick 2000). The cause and effect relationships 
defining these mechanisms are strongly interrelated and cannot be fully represented 
by conventional event trees or fault trees which consider each mechanism 
independently. It is necessary to study the details of each failure mechanism and also 
to consider their interrelations. The complexity of a system is not only due to the 
number of its components but also to the multiplicity of their cause and effect 
relationships. 
Bayesian networks are used to analyze globally the technical problems related to 
the probability of failure of the dam by describing the interrelations between the 
failure mechanisms and taking into account the uncertainties. This analysis provides 
answers to the following questions: 
1. What are the most significant factors contributing to the overall risk? 
2. What are the rehabilitation works to be realized in priority? 
 




A bayesian network is a causal graph where the variables of the considered system 
are represented by nodes and their dependencies by directional links. The underlying 
probabilistic representation allows the quantification of the strength of these 
dependencies and the realization of inferences to aid decision-making. These 
calculations are based on Bayes' theorem which can be considered as the 
mathematical expression of learning from experience. 
This form of artificial intelligence allows the global consideration of a 
problem by putting into perspective all of its components. The representation of 
knowledge is achieved by establishing the cause and effect relationships between the 
variables and by determining the conditional probabilities, by calculation or by expert 
elicitation, associated with these relationships. 
These principles are illustrated on Figure 1 in which a causal model (where A 
is the direct cause of B and C) and the underlying probability tables (including for 
example the probability of B given A noted P(B|A)) form a bayesian network which 
synthesizes knowledge related to a given problem (Becker and Nadim 1999). This 
allows reasoning under uncertainty by means of inferences. 
 
 
Figure 1. Components of a bayesian network. 
Each variable is defined by a series of states which can include numerical 
values or litteral descriptors. The probabilities underlying the causal model consist in 
a table for each variable containing a conditional probability for every state of that 
variable given every combination of states of its causes. The determination of these 
values has three fundamental components: data analysis, phenomenological models 




One of the main functions of bayesian networks is the realization of inferences where 
conditional probabilities for some variables are calculated given information 
(evidence) on other variables. The effects of new evidence is propagated in the 
network by means of algorithms based on Bayes' theorem which can be expressed in 





causeeffectPcausePeffectcauseP =    (1) 
 
In Eq. 1, prior knowledge contained in the bayesian network, P(cause), is 
transformed in posterior knowledge, P(cause|effect), considering the likelihood of the 
new information, P(effect|cause)/P(effect). This approach is used as a vehicle for 
drawing conclusions from observations. In a dam safety context, these observations 
can result from changes in the behaviour of a dam or from the implementation of 
structural or non-structural risk reduction measures. The symmetry of Bayes' theorem 
allows inferences by diagnosis (P(cause|effect)) and prediction (P(effect|cause)). The 
inferences are realized by using a specialized software. 
Examples of diagnoses include the determination of the most likely cause of a 
potential dam failure and the identification of the most significant component of the 
overall risk. Predictive inferences can help prioritize risk-reduction measures by the 
comparison of P(Failure|Risk-reduction measure) with P(Failure). 
 
5. Bayesian network for the analyzed dam 
 
5.1 Causal model 
 
The failure of the dam (variable F on Figure 2) is analyzed by considering internal 
erosion and overtopping. These failure mechanisms are affected by the reservoir level 
(RL) which depends on the precipitations (P) and spillway operation (SO). The wind 
speed (WS) influences both the spillway operation and the risk of overtopping. 
The spillway is operational if the gates (G1 to G3) and the lifting mechanism 
(LM) are functioning. The latter depend on the gantry crane (GC) and the electrical or 
manual winches (EW, MW). The three gates are considered separately to model 
partial opening of the spillway. Overtopping (O) depends on the risk of wave runup 
(WR) during strong winds and on the reservoir level. Internal erosion requires carried 
soil particles (CSP) from the dam itself or its foundation which can occur in the 
presence of an unfiltered seepage exit (UFE), erodible soil (ES) and a high enough 
hydraulic gradient (HG). The latter depends on the reservoir level and the presence of 
more permeable zones (PZ). These relationships form the causal model of the 
bayesian network for the analyzed dam (see Figure 2). 
 
 




Each variable shown on Figure 2 is related to a conditional probability table 
expressing the strength and degree of uncertainty of its causal dependencies. An 
example for variable LM is shown on Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Probability table for the lifting mechanism (variable LM). 
GC = yes no 
MW = yes no yes no 
EW = yes no yes no yes no yes no 
LM = yes 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
LM = no 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
 
The lifting mechanism (LM) is always functional, P(LM = yes) = 1, if the 
gantry crane (GC) is functional and the electrical winch (EW) or the manual winch 
(MW) is also functional. The probability values in Table 1 were determined with the 
help of a fault tree. The logical relations on that fault tree were transposed in the 
bayesian network to consider the reliability of the mechanical/electrical components 
of the spillway in a more global manner which includes also the geotechnical and 
hydrological risks. 
Other approaches can also be used to determine the conditional probability 
values. When large data sets are available, the probabilities can be computed with the 
help of statistics. This option is often used for meteorological data. Other evaluations 
are based on mathematical models such as hydrological and flood routing 
calculations to determine maximum reservoir levels for different recurrence periods. 
For this study, these models took into account the precipitations and the number of 
gates in operation (0 to 3). Other probabilities, for example those related to internal 
erosion, are determined by expert judgement based on geotechnical models and 
knowledge about the specific characteristics of the dam and its behaviour. 
 
6. Optimal risk-reduction measures 
 
6.1 Contributing variables 
 
Inferences are realized on the bayesian network of Figure 2 to identify the variable 
contributing the most to the overall risk. The probability of failure of the dam 
represent here the overall risk and the decision basis for the selection of the optimal 
risk-reduction measure. 
The probability of failure serves as a common denominator with which the 
negative impact of the observation or non observation of one or more variables Va is 





VaFPFPimpact −=      (2) 
 
The variables contributing the most to the overall risk have a greater negative 
impact as well as a greater probability of occurrence. These parameters define the 
criticality of a variable which is calculated using Eq. 3. 
 
)(* VaPimpactycriticalit =     (3) 
 
Inferences and calculations using a bayesian network software and Eq. 2 and 3 
indicate that overtopping is the most probable failure mechanism. Specifically, the 
most critical variable is the gantry crane which is affected by the low reliability of its 
components and also the frequent strong winds. A functional failure of the gantry 
crane is a cause of an non operational spillway which increases greatly the 
overtopping risk. Therefore, a rehabilitation of the gantry crane would be the most 
efficient specific risk-reduction measure. 
The carrying of soil particles (CSP) is related to the internal erosion failure 
mechanism and is also one of the most critical component of the overall risk. The 
construction of a filtering berm at the downstream toe of the dam would provide 
filtered seepage exits (UFE = no) which will normally stop particle erosion 
(P(CSP|UFE = no) = 0) therefore reducing the internal erosion risk. 
6.2 Priority rehabilitation work 
 
The main objective of structural rehabilitation works is to reduce risk by decreasing 
the probability of failure. The most efficient options are directed to the most critical 
variables where the potential positive impact (see Eq. 2) would be maximum. 
However, rehabilitation measures always carry a cost. In most circumstances, a dam 
owner tries to optimize its investments by realizing in priority the measures offering 
the greater risk-reduction potential for the minimal cost. The priority index is defined 






_ =      (4) 
 
The rehabilitation of the gates and lifting mechanism will greatly increase the 
spillway operability (SO = 3 gates). It should include all the mechanical/electrical 
components of the spillway and not only the gantry crane since, in this case, all the 
equipment is in such a bad shape. As a first approximation, the effect of this 
intervention is translated as P(F|SO = 3 gates). The increase of the spillway capacity 
will include the addition of a fourth gate and also the rehabilitation of the existing 
spillway. The effect of this option is translated as P(F|O = no). The construction of a 
filtering berm on the downstream toe of the dam will provide filtration to every 
seepage exit. The effect on risk is calculated using P(F|UFE = no). The construction 
of a parapet wall will reduce the risk of overtopping (O) but increase the maximum 
reservoir level (RL) thus affecting negatively the internal erosion risk. The evaluation 
of the net effect on overall risk is taken into account by creating a new variable 
(parapet wall PW) linked to O and RL and considering P(increased RL|PW) and 
P(O|PW) in the impact and priority index calculations. 
The analysis has shown that the optimal risk-reduction measure is the 
construction of a filtering berm (option 3) followed by the rehabilitation of the 
existing spillway (option 1). The failure mechanism contributing the most to the 
overall risk is overtopping. This mechanism is mainly controlled by the spillway 
operation and more specifically by the gantry crane. However, the construction of a 
filtering berm is the optimal risk-reduction measure in technical and monetary terms 
and is to be realized in priority. 
This analysis should be considered as an aid to decision covering the technical 
aspects of the problem which has also social, environmental and legal aspects. Also, 
rehabilitation measures can sometimes have negative net outcomes. For example, an 
increased spilling capacity would provide more safety for the structures but could 
endanger the population living downstream during the eventual spillway operation. 
This problem could be analyzed in an even more global way by adding consequence 
variables (which can include population at risk, potential inundated area and 
available warning time) to the bayesian network of Figure 2. 
7. Conclusions 
 
The presented concepts allowed the determination of the overall dam risk by taking 
into account the numerous interrelations between the failure mechanisms as well as 
the uncertainties and the expert judgements that are always present in the analyses. 
Risk was characterized without reference to an absolute interpretation of the 
probability of failure of the dam which can cause problems related to its 
interpretation and use. The probability of failure was rather considered as a 
comparison basis, or a common denominator, used for the determination of the 
relative importance of each uncertain element that could cause failure and to judge 
the potential effectiveness of structural or non structural risk-reduction measures. 
The use of bayesian networks has contributed to solve an actual risk analysis 
problem for a project involving irrigation and flood protection works. It was possible 
to compare, according to the probability of failure being used as a common 
denominator, the geotechnical and hydrological risks related to the embankment dam 
as well as the risk related to the reliability of the electrical/mechanical components of 
the spillway. The analysis has allowed the identification of the factors contributing 
the most to the overall risk and the interventions to be realized in priority. The 
proposed multidisciplinary approach has contributed to the integrated analysis of 
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